Despite trying to have players for all roles, GT focused on getting specific players for specific areas.
There are different methods for each team to form an Indian Premier League (IPL) squad, and each is more or less prudent. Behind every squad construction, a lot of brains operate before reaching a consensus. While some teams focus on certain individuals, others hope to cover all the bases.
In the Gujarat Titans’ (GT) case, it’s a mild combination of both scenarios. Despite trying to have players for all roles, GT focus on getting specific players for specific areas. The common theme is that they prefer experienced players rather than investing too much in young talent.
They also excel in getting most of them, as was the case in the IPL 2025 auction. But there are still a few loopholes in their approach to squad construction and resource usage. At times, their modus operandi looks adamant and faulty, even if they get results their way.
That starts reflecting right from the way they form their batting unit. There’s no problem with over-reliance on the top order, especially since they do the bulk scoring as well. But they fail to think that three batters can’t win matches on their own, even if they are as good as the ones in GT.
Now the problem is that GT have no settled batting unit beyond the top three, and they unnecessarily change batters’ positions. They used four players at No.4 and three at No.5. They put too much focus on strengthening the top three that they didn’t care about other batters.
For some reason, they don’t want to maximise the available resources, even if they are not adequate. They didn’t have specific roles for Sherfane Rutherford and Shahrukh Khan, and never tried increasing the batting depth by providing chances to Anuj Rawat, Glenn Phillips, and Mahipal Lomror. For most games, they only had five proper batters, with the likes of Rahul Tewatia and Rashid Khan batting too high for a T20 game.
When Glenn Phillips was ruled out midway, GT opted for Dasun Shanaka, another unproven and unsuitable middle-order batter, when they needed a quality specialist batter. They bought Karim Janat, who doesn’t specialise in any department. They had too many all-rounders and utility players when they needed more batters.
And this came to haunt them at the worst possible time – the final league stage game against CSK and the Eliminator. Their middle order was exposed when early wickets fell, and GT were found wanting. The defeat against CSK took away their top-two qualification, while another loss against MI eliminated them from the tournament.
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This was not limited to just batting. GT have always focused on having a solid bowling unit. They also formed one of the finest bowling attacks in the competition, but didn’t use them wisely.
Sai Kishore, who was exceptional throughout the competition, didn’t finish his spell on eight occasions out of 15 innings. When Kagiso Rabada was absent after the first few games, GT continued to shuffle between Ishant Sharma and Arshad Khan. Neither were bowling to their best, and were still given tough overs to bowl. Arshad conceded 10.33 runs per over, while Ishant went for 11.18.
They delayed Gerald Coetzee’s introduction and gave him only four games. That he was expensive doesn’t change the fact that Coetzee deserved a longer run. He was Rabada’s designated backup, and more chances would have helped him acclimatise quicker.
Their method of using Washington Sundar was beyond horrible. Despite him doing well, GT kept dropping him for some reason. While they did well to give him the No.4 spot in every game he played, GT didn’t use his superior off-spin at all, as Sundar bowled only 10.5 overs across six matches.
There’s no explanation why Sundar never got enough chances despite looking in good form. There’s no explanation why GT underutilised Shahrukh Khan as a batter and bowler. And certainly, there’s no explanation why they selected players like Dasun Shanaka and Karim Janat, who are not specialists in any department and struggle to find a place even in their national team.
Their current template works because some of their players are terrific. The team keeps revolving around them. However, when only the best teams are left or their main players have a bad day, those loopholes surface. They are too adamant in their approach despite understanding the drawbacks of the modern-day T20.
Chennai Super Kings (CSK) were equally rigid with their operations and followed a similar pattern, even though other teams in the competition upgraded with time. The results are there; they failed to qualify for the playoffs for two consecutive seasons, the first time in IPL history. They understood the changes required and started working towards them midway through IPL 2025.
Similarly, GT must understand that banking on certain individuals in the batting unit and faulty usage of players won’t help. The opponents are smart enough to exploit it as the cycle moves. There will be seasons when their premium batter or bowler is completely out of form; that’s when the issues will exacerbate. T20 is a ruthless format, and performing day in day out is next to impossible.
This GT team is not bad, nor does it need too many changes. The acquisition of a few specific players by releasing some existing ones will help. They need better resource utilisation and to maximise their strengths. The change must start from the think tank, and they must back players for each role by giving clarity. This will strengthen them further and give more freedom to other established players.
Suppose they provide a long run to Washington Sundar at No.4 and utilise their bowling. This will give the top three to bat more freely while also providing another bowling option to use according to the matchup.
Similarly, other role clarity will help the team operate in tandem rather than depending on individual performances. But if they don’t change, GT will certainly face more problems.
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